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Beyond Arabism vs. sovereignty: relocating
ideas in the international relations of the
Middle East
EWAN STEIN*
Abstract. This article critiques constructivist approaches to the international relations of the
Middle East and sets out an alternative interpretation of the role of ideas based on political
economy and the sociology of knowledge. It cautions against using constructivism as a way
of ‘building bridges’ between IR and Middle East Studies and disputes the claim that the
norms of ‘Arabism’ as a putative regional identity are in contradiction with those of
sovereignty. The article shows that this assumption is based on the combined influences
of modernisation theory and Orientalist assumptions about the power and continuity of
regional culture that have persisted in Middle East IR. This is despite the fact that there is
no reason to believe the Arabs constitute a more ‘natural’ nation than do the Syrians, Iraqis
or Egyptians. The political role and resonance of ideas can be better established by viewing
the modern history of the Middle East in terms of domestic structure and social change, and
in particular emphasising the role of rising middle classes in revolutionary nationalist
movements. The findings of this article raise questions for the utility of ‘moderate’
constructivist interpretations of International Relations as a whole.
Ewan Stein is Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Edinburgh. He works
on the politics of the Middle East, particularly political Islam and the Arab-Israeli conflict.
He is author of the forthcoming Representing Israel in Modern Egypt: Ideas, Intellectuals and
Foreign Policy from Nasser to Mubarak (I. B. Tauris, 2012) and has published in
International Studies Quarterly and Third World Quarterly.
Introduction
Over three decades since the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism, consensus
on the role ideas play in the politics of the Middle East remains elusive. Some have
maintained that the Middle East should be analysed using the universal tools and
methods of social science.1 Others view this as Eurocentrism and argue for more
supposedly open, grounded or atheoretical approaches.2 Explicit essentialism about
* I would like to thank Jamie Allinson, Victoria Loughlan, Andrew Neal, Michelle Obeid, Adham
Saouli and the three anonymous reviewers for useful comments on earlier versions of this article.
1 Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations: Power, Politics and Ideology (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005); Fred Halliday, ‘The Middle East and Conceptions of
International Society’, in Barry Buzan and Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds), International Society and the
Middle East: English School Theory at the Regional Level (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
2 Leila Abu Lughod, ‘Anthropology’s Orient: The Boundaries of Theory on the Arab World’, in
Hisham Sharabi (ed.), Theory, Politics and the Arab World (Routledge, 1991); Timothy Mitchell, ‘The
Review of International Studies (2012), 38, 881–905  2011 British International Studies Association
doi:10.1017/S0260210511000465 First published online 1 Sep 2011
881
Islam and Arab culture is relatively rare, and the likes of Samuel Huntington and
Bernard Lewis have become very much straw men in scholarly discussions about
the region. At the same time Middle Eastern exceptionalism of some kind seems
irresistible to scholars, particularly those of an International Relations (IR) bent
with their often reflexive Westphalian sensibilities.3 The region’s distinctiveness is
seen to be rooted in a variety of factors including a colonial legacy resulting in
unique ‘penetration’ by outside powers,4 a preponderance of oil resources, late
development and constrained state-formation,5 exceptional propensity to war and
conflict and – especially – shared linguistic, religious, and cultural ties that have
had an unusually powerful influence on politics. Raymond Hinnebusch expresses
what many now see as axiomatic, that ‘the powerful challenge to state identities
oﬀered by both sub and supra-state identities makes the Middle East unique’.6
Convincing approaches to Middle East international politics that consider the role
of ideas without either succumbing to essentialisms about Arab identity or Islam
or discounting indigenous ideas as codes for universal concerns remain, as Morton
Valbjørn has noted, elusive.7
Some who have tackled the ‘area studies controversy’ recently suggest that
constructivism could help ‘bridge the gap’ between IR and Middle East Studies.8
This article cautions against such optimism. It critiques constructivist approaches
to the international relations of the Middle East and argues for an alternative way
of taking ideas into account. I argue that constructivist readings of regional
dynamics build on a legacy of dubious axioms about shared Arab or Islamic
culture, the abiding influence of history and the incompatibility of modern state
forms and sovereignty with ‘supra-state’ identities like Pan-Arabism and Islam.
Although the norms of Arab politics are asserted to develop ultimately because of
Arab heritage, shared language or common history, these links are neither
theorised nor substantiated, which results in a view of regional politics as sharply
detached from the social milieus in which these norms supposedly arise. This in
turn can be attributed to a non-existent or inadequate conception of state-society
Middle East in the Past and Future of Social Science’, GAIA (2003), available at: {http://escholarship.
org/uc/item/3618c31x}.
3 For a concise discussion of arguments for and against Middle Eastern exceptionalism see Simon
Bromley, Rethinking Middle East Politics (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), pp. 86–9.
4 L. Carl Brown, International Politics and the Middle East: Old Rules, Dangerous Game (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984); Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of
Regional and Outside Powers, new ed. (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).
5 Ian S. Lustick, ‘The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political “Backwardness” in
Historical Perspective’, International Organization, 51:4 (1997), pp. 653–83.
6 Raymond Hinnebusch, ‘The Politics of Identity in Middle East International Relations’, in Louise
Fawcett (ed.), International Relations of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), p. 151. For a similar perspective see two articles by F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Balancing
What? Threat Perception and Alliance Choice in the Gulf’, Security Studies, 13:2 (Winter 2003),
pp. 273–305; and ‘Sovereignty, Statecraft and Stability in the Middle East’, Journal of International
Aﬀairs, 45:2 (1992), pp. 441–69. Also, Morton Valbjørn, ‘Arab Nationalism(s) in Transformation:
From Arab Interstate Societies to an Arab-Islamic World Society’, in Barry Buzan and Ana
Gonzalez-Pelaez (eds), International Society and the Middle East: English School Theory at the
Regional Level (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
7 Morton Valbjørn, ‘The Meeting of the Twain: Bridging the Gap between International Relations and
Middle East Studies’, Cooperation and Conflict, 38 (2003), pp. 163–73.
8 Andrea Teti, ‘Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the Disciplinary Politics of the Area
Studies Controversy’, European Journal of International Relations, 13 (2007), pp. 117–43.
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relations in which the state is regarded self-evidently as the repository of modern
Westphalian norms and society as a separate realm containing premodern identity.
In this article I suggest not that ideas are irrelevant or secondary to
understanding Arab state behaviour, but rather that their significance and
‘rootedness’ is distorted in constructivist accounts. ‘Social’ readings of Inter-
national Relations must attend to more than just the interactions between rulers.
I advance instead a more nuanced sociological analysis, with particular attention
to nationalism as a social process. Nationalist revolutionary movements in the
region have exerted a powerful integrative force, meaning that state and society are
not clearly diﬀerentiated according to a modern/premodern schema as often seems,
at least implicitly, to be assumed. The structure of each state and the shifting
nature of state-society relations must be taken into account in order to understand
the ways in which ideas have significance, how and why particular idea systems rise
and fall, and how ideational and material factors relate to each other. The way
norms circulate regionally – indeed globally – cannot be reduced to interstate
interaction.
In what follows I sketch the roots of and critique constructivist approaches to
the Middle East, primarily that of Michael Barnett. I then put forward an
approach based on political economy and the sociology of knowledge as
articulated by Karl Mannheim. My aim is not to produce a grand theoretical
alternative to the interstate dialogues model that will explain foreign policy or
international behaviour in the Middle East or elsewhere. It is rather to suggest a
framework for analysing the political significance of ideas that, though sacrificing
the parsimony of moderate constructivism, nonetheless provides a sounder basis
for the interpretation of links between ideas, regional order, and public and foreign
policy. Most generally, this reading challenges systemic or state-centric analyses of
international relations.
Critiquing constructivism: the area studies/modernisation theory nexus
First applied to IR in the late 1980s, constructivism has grown to challenge
‘rationalist’ approaches for the mainstream of the discipline. Constructivism is not
just one theory, and most constructivists would deny that it is a theory at all. It
is, rather, a set of epistemological and sociological propositions that treat reality
and the world as, to a greater or lesser extent, socially constructed. The type of
constructivism critiqued in this article, and which has been applied to the Middle
East context, is that usually termed ‘moderate constructivism’, which shares with
prevailing neorealist approaches to IR the acceptance of the state and states system
as the primary organising and analytical factors in international relations.
Moderate constructivists rely heavily on the related but distinct categories of norms
and identity. As defined in the theoretical chapter to a landmark constructivist
work, norms establish ‘collective expectations about proper behavior for a given
[state] identity’. Identity, on the other hand, refers to ‘mutually constructed and
evolving images of self and other’, where the ‘self’ is the state since ‘states operate
as actors’. Both norms and identity influence state policies and are mutually
constitutive: norms shape interests and policies in addition to aﬀecting state
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identity. Identity, most significantly for the purposes of this article, aﬀects the
interests and policies of states and shapes ‘interstate normative structures’.9
Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein also draw a distinction between nationhood
and statehood: the former comprises ‘nationally varying ideologies of collective
distinctiveness and purpose’ while the latter constitutes ‘country variation in state
sovereignty, as it is enacted domestically and projected internationally’. Sovereignty
is ‘the most fundamental institution in international society’.10 It is this global
norm that is ‘crucial in the construction of state identity’.11 State identity, then, is
most closely tied to the global norm of sovereignty and coexists, in either
complementary or contradictory fashion, with locally distinctive national identity.
The Middle East, as will be shown, has been used as an example of a part of the
world where these two identities (state and nation) are contradictory: in the
constructivist reading it has been ‘Arabism’, as a collective regional identity, that
has informed ‘interstate normative structures’ as much if not more than the wider
interstate norms of sovereignty.
Assumptions about the power of Pan-Arabism, and an allegedly related Middle
Eastern diplomatic culture, led many students of the Middle East – long before the
rise to fashion of constructivism – to suggest that ideas, culture and identity have
a prominent, even constitutive, role in regional patterns of behaviour. Arabism, in
particular, has been treated as a normative framework constraining and guiding
Arab foreign policy and constituting Arab state interests. Although not the only
part of the world aﬀected by increased interest in identity and norms since the end
of the Cold War,12 the Middle East has attracted substantial attention as a region
where such factors supposedly enjoy special traction, a trend that was boosted –
particularly in relation to religious ideas – following 11 September 2001.13 The
most developed constructivist account of Arab regional politics, that of Michael
Barnett, contends that dialogues between Arab states as to the form and content
of Arabism have been the central dynamic of the region’s modern history.
Barnett’s case ultimately rests on his reading of the area studies specialist
literature and he admits not to be uncovering ‘new facts’. Despite the usual IR
approach that sees Arab states as quintessentially realist,14 Barnett avers, ‘few
accounts of Arab politics argue that the state’s interests stemmed from anarchy;
most discuss Arab national interests that derived from their shared Arab
identity’.15 I will analyse Barnett’s contribution in more detail later in this article,
but will first revisit some of the accounts of Arab regional politics on which
9 Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter Katzenstein, ‘Norms, Identity and Culture in
National Security’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 45–59.
10 Ibid., p. 45.
11 Ibid., p. 46.
12 See, for example, Seng Tan, ‘Rescuing Constructivism from the Constructivists: a Critical Reading
of Constructivist Interventions in Southeast Asian Security’, The Pacific Review, 19:2 (2006),
pp. 239–60.
13 Mustapha Kamal Pasha, ‘Fractured Worlds: Islam, Identity, and International Relations’, Global
Society, 17:2 (2003), pp. 111–20.
14 The classic in this vein, and Barnett’s main foil, is Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1987).
15 Michael Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1998), p. 4.
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Barnett builds. A large part of the constructivist case rests on the axioms of a
canon of scholarship on the international relations of the Middle East dating back
to the 1950s.
The area-studies legacy
Approaching the Middle East as a single cultural – and, by extension, ‘national’ –
region onto which a states system has been artificially imposed resonates with both
the modernisation paradigm in political science and the Orientalist tradition in
Middle East Studies. The transition from empires to nation-states in the interwar
and post-World War II periods was decisive in steering academia toward the
analysis of the state as the primary and essential unit of human organisation. Each
new state to emerge from empires was seen to contain characteristics distinctive to
itself, but amenable to scientific analysis using universal tools. While content
changed, form remained rigidly constant: ‘Each geographical unit was imagined, in
turn, to possess an economy . . .; a self-contained political system or state; an
homogenous body called society; and even a distinctive national culture’.16 Those
involved in social science disciplines could specialise in discrete parts of each
nation-state (its economy, sociology, political system, culture), but the study of
broader cultural areas was something for which only students of ‘area studies’ were
seen to be competent. Soon after the Second World War the newly founded Middle
East Journal announced that an understanding of any one country in the Middle
East could be advanced ‘only through a proper knowledge of all’, and this because
of the shared Islamic heritage and experience of European colonialism. The
‘imaginary geographies’ exposed by Edward Said,17 inscribed and reinscribed by
generations of Orientalists, were thus carried over into area studies as scholars
‘brought from oriental studies the idea that the Islamic world formed a cultural
unity, based on a common cultural core that only the Orientalist was equipped to
decipher’.18
Just as relativism in the social sciences went hand in hand with the flowering
of nationalism in the colonies, the area studies contention that world regions –
defined culturally and constituted historically – were more ‘real’ than the new states
that emerged as a result of decolonisation was bolstered by the rise of popular
Pan-Arabist political movements and the apparently unstoppable momentum of
the Egyptian Revolution of 1952.19 By the late 1950s, the formation of the United
Arab Republic (UAR) between Egypt and Syria, revolution in Iraq and Arab
nationalist revolt in Lebanon encouraged the formalisation of a regionalist, and
culturalist view of Middle East politics and its transfer into IR.20 For Leonard
16 Mitchell, ‘The Middle East in the Past and Future of Social Science’, p. 7.
17 Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
18 Mitchell, ‘The Middle East in the Past and Future of Social Science’, p. 5.
19 For one interpretation of that revolution’s regional eﬀects see Maridi Nahas, ‘State-Systems and
Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East’, International Journal of Middle
East Studies, 17:4 (November 1985), pp. 507–27.
20 The regionalist approach – not just to the Middle East but for IR in general – was formally and
theoretically enshrined by political scientists like Leonard Binder, as well as Louis Cantori and
Michael Brecher. For a good discussion of this literature see Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers
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Binder in 1958 ‘. . . the most important characteristic setting apart the Middle East
as a subordinate international system is the ideological context of its politics, both
domestic and external’. In this ‘year of revolution’, Binder confidently aﬃrmed
that:
[T]he political boundaries which have been established in the area have little historical
significance and frequently less ethnic validity . . . The existence of such boundaries over a
relatively short period of time has tended to fix them in a legal and political sense for the
present, but they must be recognized as inherently unstable. If they are to be retained for
any purposeful reason, such policy will require positive action.21
The cultural context of the Middle Eastern subordinate system, for Binder,
explained the volatile nature of its politics. In terms that would become
commonplace, he argued that the instability of the Middle East resulted from ‘the
usual incongruity of nation and territorial state’. Binder extrapolated from this a
range of other special features of Middle East politics: the instability of alliances
with extra-regional powers; the ‘ease with which domestic politics may aﬀect aﬀairs
in neighbouring countries’; ‘the greater ease in maintaining the status quo than in
changing it’; and the ‘near equality of the role of each Middle Eastern state within
the subordinate system’. More ominously, Binder also saw that ‘these factors add
up to an inherent instability of system, suggesting further that, should external
vigilance be relaxed or a domestic (and therefore inaccessible) upheaval take place,
violent changes will occur throughout the area’.22
Binder’s regional approach was pioneering. Although proceeding from the
assumption that the states were ‘inherently unstable’ and artificial, he recognised
that new states did exist and that they were conducting relations with each other.
Rather than approaching the Middle East in ‘wheel and spoke’ terms as the
relations of individual peoples (Arabs, Turks) and polities (the Ottoman Empire,
Egypt, the Palestine Mandate) to great powers,23or ignoring the states and focusing
only on broad cultural commonalities, Binder prioritised the internal dynamics of
a subsystem of states conditioned by history and shared culture to act in distinctive
ways. Subsequent studies like Malcolm Kerr’s The Arab Cold War laid much of the
empirical groundwork for the regionalist level of analysis. Kerr accepted, albeit
reluctantly, a conception of Arabism as an untheorised independent variable:
Why the idea of unity is so strong among Arabs – so much more than among Latin
Americans, for instance, or the English-speaking nations – is a mystery that neither Arab
nor western historians have satisfactorily explained . . . [W]e shall content ourselves with
acknowledging that this obsession, whatever its causes, is an important psychological force,
and therefore a political reality, which warring politicians seek to use against each other.24
If Kerr reserved judgement on Arabism’s provenance, other scholars sought
historical explanations for regional identity. In L. Carl Brown’s work, political or
and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955–1967 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994),
pp. 4–17.
21 L. Binder The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East (New York and London: Wiley, 1964), p. 264.
22 Ibid., pp. 264–7.
23 Some, such as Rashid Khalidi, continue to bemoan the ‘wheel and spoke’ approach to the
historiography of the Middle East. (Centre for the Advanced Study of the Arab World Annual
Lecture, University of Manchester, 23 October 2009).
24 Malcolm H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970, 3rd ed.
(London: Published for the Royal Institute of International Aﬀairs by Oxford University Press,
1971), p. 1.
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diplomatic culture embodies the distinctiveness of the region.25 Brown echoes
Binder’s convictions about the superficiality of the states system grafted onto the
Middle East. He defines the Middle East as the Afro-Asian lands of the former
Ottoman Empire, in order to show the lasting influence of the Ottoman heritage,
and to root the region’s specificity in its history. This results in a tautology wherein
the Ottoman influence ‘gives the region an identity established not in terms of
outsiders’ interests but by an indigenous standard, that of having shared for
centuries a common political bond’. It is this identity that undergirds his
delineation of the Middle East as a unit of analysis and ‘system’. The exclusion of
non-Ottoman lands (Iran) or non-Middle Eastern states with an Ottoman heritage
that would allow him to test ‘the relative importance of the Ottoman legacy’ is
testimony to the a priori nature of this assumption.26
Brown elaborates his main thesis, that the outside penetration of the Middle
East since the early nineteenth century has fostered a political culture peculiar to
the region, with reference to the seven ‘rules of the game’ of Middle Eastern
politics.27Although he does not make the distinction himself, the rules can be
organised into structural and agential characteristics, highly suggestive of the later
constructivist norms-identity division. Structural rules include a series of interlock-
ing (kaleidoscopic) alliances, great power interest in the region for reasons of
rivalry rather than rationality, and a tendency toward ‘homeostasis’ – defined as
the inability of any one power to impose its will over the others. Other rules relate
to the predispositions of agents within the system and are highly reminiscent of the
Orientalist essentialism lambasted by Edward Said: the proclivity for the ‘quick
grab’, the disinclination to break issues down into manageable chunks, the
preference for reactive politics, the preference for using outside mediators as
guarantors, the concentration on tactics instead of strategy and the mentality of
zero-sum games. These characteristics, though not unique to the region individu-
ally, ‘combine to make the Middle East in modern times a distinctive politico-
diplomatic system’.28 The uniqueness of this combination of characteristics,
however, is purely hypothetical and not convincingly linked either to the Ottoman
heritage or to other causal factors. The articulators or creators of the Middle
Eastern political culture are not introduced; the relationship between the agential
and structural ‘rules’ not elaborated. While the views of Western statesmen since
the nineteenth century on the nature of the Middle East are examined to show the
longevity of ‘Eastern question’ dynamics, views of Middle Easterners themselves
are not explored.29
Brown’s discussion of a ‘pattern of politics’ or ‘system of political interaction’
surviving in the Middle East since Ottoman times anticipated the constructivist
reading of international politics in general: a common epistemology shared by all
25 Brown, International Politics and the Middle East.
26 Ibid., pp. 5–9. F. Gregory Gause III has also criticised Brown for his vague selection criteria in
‘Systemic Approaches to Middle East International Relations’, International Studies Review, 1:1
(1999), pp. 11–31.
27 Fred Halliday has described these rules as ‘either generic to politics the world over or based on
questionable assumptions of historic continuity’, though to be fair to Brown it is the combination
of the seven rules he asserts is unique. Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations, p. 24,
fn. 8.
28 Brown, International Politics and the Middle East, p. 18.
29 Ibid., pp. 233–5.
Beyond Arabism vs. sovereignty 887
members of the system defines and configures what politics will, or will appear to,
be. Under the neorealist paradigm, power had been understood in material terms,
with the ‘balance’ of power constituting the underlying dynamic of international
relations. Constructivists and others questioned this as the Cold War came to an
end. Many followed the tradition of Michel Foucault, and Edward Said, to see
power partially or even primarily in an actor’s ability to enforce or otherwise
induce others to adopt particular interpretations of the world.30 Ideas, norms,
perceptions, and identity came, for many, to more clearly reflect the complexities
and ambiguities of a post-bipolar world, perhaps especially in the Middle East.
Although constructivists are generally at pains to distance themselves from the
rationalism of mainstream IR, their view of power as the ability to shape
worldviews was far from being marginal to the discipline. Most prominently,
Joseph Nye’s idea of ‘soft power’, first articulated in 1990, was premised on the
assumption that actors, once persuaded to adopt American values as their own,
will cease to pose threats to American hegemony, and focussed on ideas, norms,
and identity.31 As with Samuel Huntington’s oft-cited intervention on the ‘clash of
civilisations’, the concept of soft power was further elaborated in relation to the
Middle East, and in particular Middle Eastern ideas as opposed, and as explicit
threats, to states:
If the Soviet Union and Communism presented the most dangerous soft-power challenges
to the US in the Cold War era, today’s greatest challenge comes from radical Islamist
ideology and organizations. In particular, the fundamentalist Wahhabi sect . . . has been
augmented by radical outgrowths of the Muslim Brotherhood movement.32
Such mainstream interest in ideas, particularly Middle Eastern ones, after the Cold
War helped to create a receptive environment for constructivist scholarship and an
appetite for Middle Eastern case studies. The Middle East has been put forward
as an invaluable ‘laboratory’ for IR, and constructivism touted as a way to ‘bridge
the gap’ between the discipline and Middle East area studies.33 But such
interdisciplinary enthusiasm reflects, and encourages, tautological assumptions such
as the following:
Constructivist theories, which . . . prioritise shared experience, norms and values, as against
crude measurement of state power, would appear to have considerable purchase in a region
where ideas and identity retain strong explanatory value.34
30 Stefano Guzzini, ‘The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis’, Millenium – Journal of
International Studies, 33 (2003), pp. 495–522.
31 Joseph S. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books,
1990).
32 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, 1st ed. (New York: Public
Aﬀairs, 2004), p. 96.
33 Bahgat Korany, ‘International Relations Theory: Contributions from Research in the Middle East’,
in Mark A. Tessler, Jodi Nachtwey, and Anne Banda (eds), Area Studies and Social Science:
Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999);
Valbjørn, ‘The Meeting of the Twain: Bridging the Gap between International Relations and Middle
East Studies’; Teti, ‘Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the Disciplinary Politics of the
Area Studies Controversy’.
34 Louise Fawcett, ‘Alliances, Cooperation and Regionalism in the Middle East’, in Louise Fawcett
(ed.), International Relations of the Middle East, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004),
p. 176.
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And:
Constructivism would seem to be particularly relevant to the Middle East, given the
exceptional power of supra-state identities (Arabism and Islam) over state conduct and the
near absence of the national-states assumed by realism.35
To assert the absence of ‘national-states’ not only accepts that bounded nations
exist elsewhere, but also downplays or ignores the integrative eﬀects of state-based
nationalist movements in the region while uncritically accepting the assertion that
the Arab people constitute a nation.36 For Barnett, and others that have sought to
use constructivism as an alternative to realism, the mediator between Arabism as
a set of constraining or enabling regional norms and Arab ‘national’ identity
remains the Arab state as unitary actor. But the nature of this mediation is not
theorised. As such, scholars should not accord Arabism, Islam or Middle Eastern
diplomatic culture ‘exceptional power’ over state conduct and from there conclude
that constructivism is ‘particularly relevant’. Kerr’s ‘mystery’ of Arab desires for
unity remains unsolved.
The influence of modernisation theory
Discussions of states in the Middle East have frequently stressed their artificiality,
illegitimacy and lack of ‘fit’ with society. Often formal state structures are
approached as modern grafts which Arab societies, belonging to a separate
premodern sphere governed by other values and norms, instinctively reject. This
clearly resonates with the modernisation paradigm, which posits the progressive
universalisation of Western economic, political and cultural patterns, in particular
the nation-state format. Analyses that give centre stage to Arabism as a normative
framework emerging from Arab identity imply that this ‘internal’ variable, if not
more significant in conditioning regional politics than the ‘external’ factor of
modern Westphalian norms, at least qualifies and disrupts the ‘normal’ interactions
of these states.37 The progressive normative evolution from Arabism to sovereignty
in the Arab World seems at least implicitly to be attributed to the success of
modernisation in the region: as the incongruity between state and nation recedes,
politics become more ‘normal’.
35 Hinnebusch, ‘The Politics of Identity in Middle East International Relations’, p. 160.
36 Constructivist frameworks should, moreover, be universally applicable and not ‘particularly relevant’
to the Middle East. Hinnebusch stops short of wholehearted support for constructivism by arguing
it must be supplemented with ‘structuralist accounts of material constraints’. But such theoretical
eclecticism seems unnecessary when structuralism alone would have no problem incorporating ideas
as a variable in this way: few followers of Marx or Waltz would object to the notion that ideas
are significant, but only within the constraints imposed by the material world or international
system. See The international politics of the Middle East (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
2003).
37 This internal and external diﬀerentiation, and attendant Eurocentrism, has been noted with respect
to general constructivist works treating identities and norms, which carry similar biases: ‘good’
norms such as human rights and respect for sovereignty originate in the West. See Martha
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in
International Relations and Comparative Politics’, Annual Revue of Political Science, 4 (2001), pp.
391–416.
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Since the first major application of modernisation theory to the Middle East,38
studies in this tradition have sought to uncover and explain obstacles to
modernisation (or democratisation), with some variant of ‘culture’ often topping
the list. The classic example remains Michael Hudson’s Arab Politics: The Search
for Legitimacy.39 The Weberian concept of legitimacy here hinges on the
relationship between state and nation:
The legitimate order requires a distinct sense of corporate selfhood: the people within a
territory must feel a sense of political community which does not conflict with other
subnational or supranational communal identifications . . . Without authoritative political
structures endowed with ‘rightness’ and eﬃcacity, political life is certain to be violent and
unpredictable.40
The ‘legitimacy crisis’ that states of the Middle East face stems from the fact that
the modernisation ‘package’ has disrupted but not replaced ‘traditional political
relationships’ in the Arab world.41 Legitimacy can thus be created only by
reversing modernisation (unthinkable under the paradigm) or through the trickle-
down of modern norms into society, at the expense of ‘traditional’ identities and
patterns of behaviour.
Modernisation theory, whose problematic reification of both the ‘traditional’
and the modern was convincingly exposed some time ago,42 continues to colour
work on the role of ideas in foreign policy, with the dichotomy of modern norms
‘outside’ and traditional identities ‘inside’ clearly maintained. John Ruggie, for
example, has argued that ‘fundamental modernist concepts such as market
rationality, sovereignty, and personal privacy would not have been comprehensible
before the development of appropriate terms of social discourse’, and that ‘neither
human rights nor sovereignty nor Stalinism would have made any sense in those
pre-modern societies in which people’s lives were governed by notions of magic or
fate’.43 Again, it is society that is premodern while the state is modern: ‘For
traditionalist or religious fundamentalist societies even today’, Keohane and
Goldstein surmise, ‘the individualistic and secular scientific premises of [the
modern] world-view remain intellectually and morally alien’.44 In other areas of IR
and Foreign Policy Analysis, the parallel distinction between ‘strong’ and ‘weak’,
or premodern, modern or postmodern states is made to reveal the variable
integration between state and society, phase of state-formation, or the extent of a
regime’s legitimacy in the eyes of a population.45
38 Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East (Glencoe, Ill: Free
Press, 1958).
39 Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1977).
40 Ibid., p. 4.
41 Ibid.
42 See, for example, Dean Tipps, ‘Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A
Critical Perspective’, Comparative Studies in History and Society, 15 (1973), pp. 199–226.
43 Cited in R. O. Keohane and J. Goldstein ‘Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework’, in
R. Keohane and J. Goldstein (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political
Change (London: Cornell University Press, 1993).
44 Ibid., p. 9.
45 K. J. Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1996); Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: the Structure of
International Security (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
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Advocates of the concept argue that legitimacy is what ultimately allows the
state to monopolise the rightful use of violence and is a quality bestowed upon the
state, or the government, by ‘society’.46 State leaderships must seek to project ideas
that accord with societal values in order to earn or retain legitimacy. Thus,
according to one example, the Egyptian president Sadat used Islamic symbols in
order to appear more legitimate: ‘Sadat attempted to bolster Egypt’s Islamic
identity for political reasons, only to discover that religious groups violently
opposed his version of that identity’.47 If, the logic follows, Sadat had got the
identity ‘right’, he may not have had to pay the ultimate price. A key component
of this dichotomous view, rooted in modernisation theory, is thus the uncompli-
cated conceptual distinction between state and society, and the reification of each.
To return to Hudson:
The governmental system and leadership that is genuinely national, that partakes of the
nation’s history, that acts in accordance with the society’s values, and that protects its
broadest concerns is likely to be regarded as legitimate, even though particular decisions
and leaders may be unpopular or unwise.48
Were one to elaborate further on the Sadat example, one would conclude that if
Sadat had chosen the correct identity, then his visit to Jerusalem and the
subsequent peace treaty with Israel may have been unpopular but would not have
delegitimised the leadership itself. This reading overstates the leadership’s power to
select identities at will, understates the diversity of societal interests and perspec-
tives at stake, and is silent on how state and society relate to one another both
ideationally and structurally. It is diﬃcult to imagine which identity Sadat could
have chosen that would have rendered his foreign policy moves acceptable to those
that eventually carried out, or supported, his murder.
This critique should not be read as implying that no diﬀerentiation between
state and society is possible or denying that leaders make choices with reference to,
and seek to engage with, a concept of national identity. But when studying issues
of normative change, and their relevance to international behaviour, ‘society’ as a
concept must be unpacked to foreground the resonance ideas have with more
specific societal groupings. Further, the relationship between groups and the state
leadership should be understood as a dynamic process.49
The Dialogues model
Much of the literature on the role of identity and ideas in the Middle East fails to
explore the role of the domestic environment in mediating the interplay between
46 Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Idea of History and History with Ideas’, in Stephen Hobden and John M.
Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology of International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2002), p. 124.
47 S. Telhami and M. N. Barnett Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 2002), p. 12.
48 Hudson, Arab Politics, p. 2.
49 Michael Barnett himself has rightly observed that ‘constructivists have incorporated domestic
variables in either an ad hoc way or by reference to institutional theories’, without any ‘rigorous
theories of state-society relations’. ‘Historical Sociology and Constructivism: an Estranged Past, a
Federated Future?’, in Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds), Historical Sociology of
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 104.
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norms (coming from outside via the state) and identity (emanating from society).
In Dialogues, for example, Barnett stresses that the normative framework of
Arabism emerges from Arab identity: from a cultural ‘toolkit’ or ‘storehouse’, but
beyond imprecise references to shared language and heritage does not demonstrate
from where this cultural reservoir comes, or how it is mediated by the state to
inform frameworks of regional order. This is striking given that on the one hand
Barnett disavows second-image analysis, yet bases his entire model on the influence
Arabist ideas have on Arab ‘societies’.
Barnett’s work has been influential on multiple levels. It has constituted an
important point of engagement with the Middle East for the IR community, thus
helping to generate IR theory,50 and has more broadly encouraged attention to
norms and identity as constitutive factors in world politics. And, it has fed back
into Middle East area studies as an example of the utility and explanatory power
of constructivism.51 Barnett’s ongoing interest has been in the tension between
statist norms and those of Arabism in Middle Eastern politics. The 1998 Dialogues
in Arab Politics fleshes out an argument first aired in articles in the early 1990s, as
well as a chapter in the influential 1996 Katzenstein volume discussed above.52 As
such, Barnett’s work forms part of the early wave of post-Cold War interest in
identity questions. The author builds on the long tradition of viewing Middle
Eastern culture or norms as in constant tension with an imposed states system.
L. Carl brown’s ‘Middle Eastern political culture’ – the rules of the game since
Ottoman times – become, for Barnett, the norms of ‘Arabism’.
Barnett’s intention is to ‘advance a narrative of Arab politics that is
theoretically distinctive and historically instinctive’ and to:
Reconceptualize the history of inter-Arab politics, approach the debate over the desired
regional order as Arab states and societies did, understand why Arab states competed
through symbolic means to establish the norms of Arabism, and recognize how and why
those ongoing struggles over the desired regional order caused the fragmentation in the
Arab states system.53
Barnett defends his focus on the ‘third-image’, that of interstate interaction, by
rejecting in perfunctory fashion literature on Middle East state formation that
claims that ‘the softer the state is, the more it will gravitate toward transnational
ideologies: the harder it is, the easier it finds the forwarding of its own interests’,
and that ‘Arab states were more likely to lean on transnational forces if their
societies perceived these states as artificial’. While allowing some validity to these
second-image interpretations, Barnett rejects them as they assume that ‘“stateness”
must be theoretically and logically linked with a particular set of practices
50 See, for example, the section on the Middle East in Buzan and Waever, Regions and Powers. See
also, Jack Snyder, ‘Empire: a blunt tool for democratization’, Daedalus, 134:2 (Spring 2005).
51 See, in addition to examples previously referenced, Elie Podeh, ‘To Unite or Not to Unite – That
is Not the Question: the 1963 Tripartite Unity Talks Reassessed’, Middle Eastern Studies, 39:1
(January 2003), pp. 150–85. This highly empirical article uses Barnett’s contributions as an
organising framework.
52 Michael Barnett, ‘Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System’,
International Studies Quarterly, 37 (1993), pp. 271–96; ‘Sovereignty, Nationalism, and Regional
Order in the Arab States System’, International Organization, 49:3 (1995), pp. 479–510; ‘Identity and
Alliances in the Middle East’, in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), The Culture of National Security (1996).
53 Barnett, Dialogues, p. 5
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tantamount to realism and realpolitik’. He concludes that ‘domestic structures are
not the wellspring of international norms; rather, they emerge from interstate
interactions’.54
The problem with this summary dismissal of the literature on domestic
structures is that it is justified solely with reference to the constructivism/realism
debate. The literature Barnett is rejecting falls broadly within the modernisation
(and at least quasi-realist) paradigm that adopts a dichotomous view of state-
society relations centred on the Weberian concept of ‘legitimacy’, as suggested by
the phrase ‘their societies perceived these states as artificial’.55 Barnett has decided
in advance only to study interstate interactions – to ‘understand why Arab states
competed through symbolic means to establish the norms of Arabism’. At no point
does he entertain the possibility that state-society relations may be more complex
or nuanced than this, or that there may be analyses of domestic structures that do
not result in ‘realpolitik’ conclusions but nonetheless disrupt the parsimony of the
interstate dialogues model. In engaging with, if only to reject, the modernisation
tradition of area studies, Barnett reveals his acceptance of its terms of reference.
Such selective rejection of the literature on state-society relations would perhaps be
understandable were it not for the central role Barnett’s model actually accords to
societal variables in informing the ‘norms of Arabism’.
Barnett is very specific about the content of Arabism as a normative
framework, which means more than just feelings of solidarity or common purpose
among Arabs: the norms of Arabism were ‘created’ in the interwar period, secured
during the decade 1945–55, and then they declined after 1963.56 The Arab norms
that emerged out of the machinations around the Baghdad Pact, and which were
subsequently reinforced concerned, were: 1) the status of Israel and the question of
Palestine; 2) relations with the West; and 3) the prospects and desirability of
unity.57 These three issues formed the basis of the Arab ‘dialogues’ Barnett
describes. But the links between these specific concerns and the resonance they
have with the putative Arab nation so often invoked to explain regional
peculiarities are simply asserted and ultimately rest on generalisations about the
views of Arab society:
Arab leaders felt little hesitation in appropriating the symbols of Arabism in their search
for regime stability and regional influence, recognising that such symbols were ripe for
accumulation and highly eﬀective in controlling the foreign policies of other Arab states
because their populations more readily identified with the symbols of Arabism than with the
symbols of state.58
Barnett puts the Middle East forward as a test case for an approach of universal
scope and is primarily concerned with using the region to build a case against
realism, since ‘the tools of conflict did not come from a military arsenal. They
came from a cultural storehouse’.59 His findings are generalisable because ‘identity
debates may be more prominent, or at least more easily identifiable, in Arab
54 Ibid., pp. 14–15.
55 The authors Barnett cites to substantiate his point here are Avraham Sela, F. Gregory Gause III,
Rex Brynen, Amatzia Baram, and Albert Hourani.
56 Barnett, Dialogues, pp. 55–83.
57 Ibid., p. 120.
58 Ibid., emphasis added.
59 Ibid., p. 10.
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politics for what may be historically specific reasons, but their prominence helps
illuminate some features of global politics that have largely been ignored by
scholars of international politics’.60Although there is no reason why the Middle
East should be any less involved in the internecine paradigm wars of IR than any
other part of the world, the assertion that culture and ideas, the historical legacies
of empire, and – especially – the lack of congruity between state and nation mark
out or explain the peculiarities of Middle East politics remains at best
hypothetical. Although making a case for a ‘third image’, or systemic, approach
to normative change in the Arab world, Barnett’s case rests ultimately on a
‘second image’–domestic or societal – variable. But he is silent on how – and
which specific parts of – populations readily identify with, and thus shape, the
symbols of Arabism.
Examples of the imprecision with which societal variables are addressed, and
the silence on how norms and identities are ‘co-constitutive’, abound in the book.
In explaining Nasser’s decision to enter into union with Syria in 1958, for example,
Barnett identifies lack of pressure from society to enact particular polices as
evidence of the causal nature of interstate dialogues, in the process detaching
norms from the identity that supposedly sustains them:
Imperatives of regime survival, combined with symbolic accumulation and entrapment, set
into motion a series of developments that increased normative integration and mutual
orientation. But no evidence exists that this outcome [union] was desired or planned by the
key participants, demanded by unforgiving societal elements, or dictated by strategic
considerations.61
Barnett’s invocation of ‘societal elements’ is revealing. While Nasser’s pursuit of
prestige in the eyes of Arab publics was undoubtedly real, it is nonetheless striking
the extent to which regional norms have been analytically separated from the
societies to whose identity they supposedly relate. The structural characteristics of
the societies involved, and the ways in which they mediate between identity and
norms, are ignored or invoked as straw men in order to further the argument. It
is hard to imagine which ‘unforgiving societal elements’ in the Egypt of 1958, for
example, could have pressured Nasser into doing anything. The state was organised
in a tightly corporatist fashion and Nasser enjoyed broad populist appeal. The only
opposition of any strength, the Muslim Brotherhood, had been harshly suppressed,
and the weak communist movement (which in any case opposed union) survived
strictly at the regime’s pleasure. We will return to this question below.
If the formation of the UAR represented the apogee of Arabism as a regional
norm, for Barnett, the subsequent squabbling within the radical Arab camp sowed
the seeds of its eventual demise. The outcome of Nasser’s bitter quarrel with Abd
al-Karim Qasim of Iraq, by discrediting unity, ‘would further the cause of statism’
as a regional norm.62 The decline of Arabism is portrayed in dialectical relationship
to the rise of the norm of sovereignty, with the two representing opposite ends of
a continuum. For Barnett, the ‘norms of sovereignty’ have progressively triumphed
over those of Arabism in tandem with the increased legitimacy of the Arab states
themselves:
60 Ibid., p. 238.
61 Ibid., p. 135.
62 Ibid., p. 137.
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A dramatic development in Arab politics is the greater agreement among Arab states that
regional order should be premised on the norms of sovereignty. And the emergence of
sovereignty in this instance is descriptively and analytically connected to the rise of statist
identities that are better able to compete with an Arabism that generates alternative
expectations. Indeed, the features that once defined Arab politics and Arabism –
confronting Israel, shunning strategic alliances with the West, and territorial unification –
have declined in prominence and have left many wondering what is distinctive about Arab
politics.63
The regionalist tautology is restated: something should be distinctive about Arab
politics because they are Arab politics. The ‘rise of statist identities’ means the
narrowing of the incongruity between state and nation as individual states and
their leaderships become more legitimate. The attendant modernisation package
enables leaders to partake of global norms, freed from the distorting influence of
society’s Pan-Arab identifications. This, in turn, is translatable in political or
foreign policy terms as openness to the West, rapprochement with Israel and
acceptance of existing state borders. It is not incidental that the dialogues model
sees evolution toward ‘normal’ politics corresponding so closely with core Western
interests in the region, especially given the political context in which ideational
approaches to world politics developed.
Nationalism and social change: beyond Arabism vs. sovereignty
The problems with the constructivist approach as outlined above are thus twofold.
First, the power of regional identity over state behaviour, particularly its detraction
from sovereignty, is not demonstrated but is rather assumed, as it is in much of
the area studies literature on which Barnett draws. Second, the uncomplicated and
dichotomous view of the state-society relationship, and quasi-voluntarist concep-
tion of identity choices, precludes consideration of internal factors, obscures the
ways in which state, society and the international interrelate, and thus produces a
distorted picture of ideas, their role and significance in the politics of the region.
The norms of sovereignty are implicitly linked to modernity and the broader
Westphalian norms of an external international system, whereas the internal Arab
identity that renders the Middle East distinctive is viewed uncritically and a priori
as a premodern residue deriving from the common cultural heritage, predisposi-
tions and history of the region.
In the next section of this article I outline – albeit in largely skeletal form – a
more nuanced approach aimed at relocating ideas in the international relations of
the Middle East. The following alternative takes the ‘social’ commitments of
constructivists seriously, but insists that this must be taken to mean more than the
interactions between states, or their leaders. Identity at the state level does not arise
preformed and available for regimes’ exploitation, and nor is it selectable by
regimes from a ‘menu of choices’.64 The alternative approach draws on political
economy, and sociological, traditions within Middle East Studies. These are
exemplified in the study of domestic politics by the work of scholars like Nazih
63 Ibid., p. 13.
64 Telhami and Barnett, Identity and Foreign Policy in the Middle East, p. 13.
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Ayubi, Hana Batatu, Asef Bayat, Roger Owen, and Sami Zubaida; and in the
international sphere most prominently via the contributions of Simon Bromley and
Fred Halliday, though characteristically the distinction is blurred for such writers.
A Mannheimian approach to ideas in the Middle East
An understanding of the role, significance and provenance of ideas in the
international relations of the region, can also be enriched by applying insights
derived from the sociology of knowledge, as elucidated by its principle founding
father, Karl Mannheim.65 Mannheim’s critique, via Marx, of Hegel mirrors in
some ways the current paper’s case against moderate constructivism and remem-
bering Mannheim’s relationship with IR as a discipline revives an old, yet clearly
still relevant, debate. His ideas are familiar to students of IR primarily via E. H.
Carr who, in his 1939 work The Twenty Years Crisis, applied insights about the
role of classes and groups in the formation of ‘ideology and utopia’ to the state as
a corporate actor to the international realm.66Carr justified this move by rejecting
Marx’s discovery that ‘all thought was conditioned by the economic interest and
social status of the thinker’, noting that ‘[t]his view was perhaps unduly restrictive.
In particular Marx, who denied the existence of “national” interests, underesti-
mated the potency of nationalism as a force conditioning the thought of the
individual’.67
Mannheim had rejected Hegel’s idea that ideology (or what may now be termed
‘identity’) was unified and stabilised at the level of the nation-state, varying with
nationality as a volkgeist. Following Marx, he insisted that intellectual forms and
worldviews varied with social class, and not only between states or nationalities.
Carr in a sense brings Hegel ‘back in’ by stressing the ‘potency of nationalism’.
This had the eﬀect of allowing state to eclipse class as the source of ideology and
locus of normative or cultural change, which arguably left a heavy mark on the
discipline of IR as a whole. It is thus fitting to return to Mannheim for a way to
bring ideas back ‘inside’ the state.
Karl Mannheim argued that the ideas and ideologies we associate with
modernity originated in the experience of social groups, in particular the rising
bourgeoisies in the states of Europe that sought to wrest political power from the
church. Mannheim saw ideological change (or shifts in national identity) as a
continuous, and destabilising, process; with the social mobility produced by
capitalism leading elite intellectuals to assimilate the concerns and worldviews of
65 K. Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960). Fred Halliday was also in favour of taking Mannheim seriously,
though for diﬀerent reasons. Halliday’s concern was to rehabilitate Orientalist research after the
Saidian onslaught from the 1980s. Mannheim, he argued, showed that ideas did not lose there
validity on account of their provenance. See ‘“Orientalism” and its Critics’, British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, 20:2 (1993), p. 159.
66 E. H. Carr and M. Cox, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), II. For a cogent analysis of Carr’s debt to, and
modification of, Mannheim’s sociology of knowledge see Charles Jones, ‘Carr, Mannheim, and a
Post-Positivist Science of International Relations’, Political Studies, 45:2 (1997).
67 Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 66.
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lower strata, while rising groups adopted elements of elite culture.68 The result was
a revolutionary dialectic wherein ‘ideology’, which legitimised the status quo,
embraced elements of ‘utopia’ that would, if realised, upset the established order,
and vice versa. There is more to Mannheim’s sociology than this, but these insights
are most suggestive for our purposes.
For constructivists norms and identity are mutually constituted. But, in
Barnett’s work at any rate, this co-constitution of the norms of Arabism and Arab
identity is asserted rather than demonstrated. The section that follows shows,
firstly, some of the ways in which the norms of Arabism identified by Barnett do
in fact relate to local identities and, secondly, the ways in which statist norms are
also related to these identities. These processes reinforce, rather than contradict,
each other. For reasons of space, the discussion below is suggestive and
introductory, rather than exhaustive, in nature. No attempt is made to cover
equally or comprehensively all parts of the Middle East, or to justify the examples
cited. My intention is not to develop a grand theoretical alternative to the
dialogues model for explaining state behaviour, but is rather to suggest ways in
which a sociology of knowledge approach could provide a better foundation for
analysing the role and provenance of ideas as ‘wellsprings of international norms’
in the Middle East.
The straightforward association of the norm of sovereignty with externality, as
opposed to internal identities like Arabism or Islam, appears on the surface to be
justified historically: ‘modern’ ideas and institutions, including state sovereignty,
originated in Europe and were exported around the world via imperialism. But, as
we know from Mannheim, the ideas themselves were not the product of European
culture or identity per se. The Westphalian norm of sovereignty related funda-
mentally to the worldviews of the rising bourgeoisies of Europe. It expressed the
transition from feudalism to absolutism and the interests of aspiring classes in that
change.69 Although the ‘capture’ of the state by bourgeoisies successfully disguised
the fact, they were not primarily attributes of European ‘national’ cultures or
identities.70 The same applies, as will be shown below, to the Middle East.
To be sure, statist norms, ideology, and structures did not arise in the Middle
East, as in Europe, out of indigenous social struggle, though it is wise to be
cautious about too categorical an insistence on the West’s exclusive ownership of
capitalism and its institutional and intellectual forms.71 But they were nevertheless
championed by intellectuals of discernable social groups: those belonging or linked
68 Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, p. 31. The question of intellectuals, in particular Mannheim’s
conception of a ‘free’ or ‘classless’ intelligentsia that collectively synthesises the ideas of society’s
contending classes, is a complex one that cannot be explored here. Mannheim diﬀers sharply here
with an otherwise similar sociologist of intellectuals, Antonio Gramsci, for whom intellectuals remain
class-bound and ideology in the modern state is ‘bourgeois’ ideology. For a discussion of the
sociology of intellectuals, see Michiel Baud and Rosanne Rutten, ‘Introduction’, in Michiel Baud
and Rosanne Rutten (eds), Popular Intellectuals and Social Movements: Framing Protest in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
69 For an historical discussion of this process around the world, as well as an argument for the
distinctive role of the ‘political’, over the purely economic, in this transition, see Perry Anderson,
Lineages of the Absolutist State, (London: NLB, 1974).
70 Gramsci’s ideas on hegemony are directed toward the elucidation and explanation of this disguising.
See, for example, Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (New
York and London: International Publishers: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971), p. 327.
71 See Peter Gran, Islamic Roots of Capitalism : Egypt, 1760–1840 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University
Press, 1998).
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to the expanded ruling and bureaucratic elites of Egypt, Iran and the Ottoman
Empire. Intellectual innovators during the formation of the modern Middle East
were often landowners, merchants or professionals associated with the small but
growing capitalist sectors that emerged, with variable orientations vis-à-vis the
state, in the Ottoman Empire, Iran and Egypt. Westphalian norms, of the
sovereign nation-state as the primary and ultimate form of political identification,
generally speaking reached the Middle East via a small class of elites with an
interest in maintaining their position at the intersection of local and global
markets. They were strongly encouraged by imperialism and advanced by elites
who strove with varying degrees of success, often through temporary alliances with
established – generally religious – sources of knowledge production, to connect
them with existing worldviews and structures. This applied to the supporters of the
Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire, as it did to the coterie of intellectuals
around the Muhammad Ali dynasty in Egypt and the narrow educated intelligent-
sia that gave conceptual form to Iran’s Constitutional Revolution.
Modern norms thus had a clear class association in the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, and such ideas may initially have appeared superficial,
representing ‘ideologies in the banal sense of the word, imported as readily as new
fashions in clothes’.72 But as Aziz al-Azmeh has memorably countered, although
such ideas:
are of European provenance, their universality implies, in the strongest sense, that they
have become indigenous elsewhere, being locally produced and reproduced, not unlike
cricket, which is played rather better in the former colonies than in its country of origin.73
The international expression of this ‘regime of modernity’ linked to the formation
of national markets which ‘established the state as the main actor in the cultural
and legal fields, making the state the node of hegemonic activity within society’, is
the norm of sovereignty. The modernity of early Arab, Iranian and Egyptian
nationalisms included – indeed necessitated – veneration of the norm of sover-
eignty. Awareness of and respect for sovereignty became, as the modern Middle
East took shape, part and parcel of upper and, increasingly, middle class culture.
To cite one example, in perhaps the most ostensibly ‘artificial’ of nascent Arab
states, Iraq, there was ‘some inherent contradiction between the ideal of one Iraqi
people and that of one Arab nation, but the element of contradiction was mitigated
by the fact that the aim of pan-Arab unity – as distinct from inter-Arab
cooperation – was at no time actively pursued’.74 Some of the popularity of the
more radical (as opposed to monarchical) Pan-Arabism among the middle classes,
particularly the military, in the 1930s and 1940s can be attributed to economic
concerns that would, with time, change:
the superior weight of the pan-Arab trend was the consequence, partly, of the fact that a
very large number of the younger oﬃcers hailed from the northern Arab provinces, which
leaned strongly toward pan-Arabism, inasmuch as they had been economically linked with
72 Abdallah Laroui, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism? (Berkeley and
London: University of California Press, 1976), p. 106.
73 Aziz al-Azmeh, ‘Nationalism and the Arabs’, Arab Studies Quarterly, 17:1–2 (1995).
74 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s
Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba’thists and Free Oﬃcers, Reprinted ed.
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 28.
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Syria and Palestine before World War I and now still suﬀered from the partition of the
Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire and the obstacles of the new frontiers.75
The consolidation of a national (that is, Iraqi) market and borders eroded the
salience of middle class Pan-Arabism and may help explain the subsequent
dominance of communism as an explicitly statist movement in Iraq.
The genesis of many Pan-Arab or pan-Islamic ideas, and their articulation with
statism, can be traced to intellectuals from religious establishments. The intellec-
tuals of the nineteenth century were overwhelmingly ‘ulema [sing. ’alim], men of
religious learning. Ulema in Egypt, the Ottoman Empire and Iran were not a class
apart but were stratified according to their own hierarchies and intermingled with
the rest of the population. Some, as Hisham Sharabi notes, came from the lower
classes in the villages and towns and were ‘formed intellectually by essentially the
same type of training and education’.76 But religious establishments also owned
land, a factor that placed them squarely within the emerging globalised political
economy of the region.
This was particularly the case in Iran, where they also collected their own taxes
and enjoyed significant independence from the Qajar state.77 In Egypt and the
Ottoman Empire, on the contrary, the ulema grew increasingly dependent on the
state for their livelihoods.78 To the extent ‘national’ identities were emerging
they did so initially via these indigenous intellectuals who could bridge the gap
between elites and the masses, combining statism with existing discursive – that is
Islamic – traditions. In nineteenth century Iran, the revolutionary character of
Shi’ism, propagated by ulema that shared with broad sections of the population
disgruntlement against the Qajar state and the intrusions of imperialism, nonethe-
less proved instrumental in creating an Iranian sense of national identity that
would, with the 1905–1907 Constitutional Revolution, further the cause of statism.
As has been observed of the revolutionaries: ‘they frequently referred to the
teachings of Imams ‘Ali, Hussein, and Hassan; but not a single one of these Shi’i
Imams had ever spoken of elected National Assemblies’.79
In Cairo, Istanbul and Tehran intellectuals crafted ideologies that synthesised
potentially destabilising universalist (that is, revolutionary or utopian) new ideals
with the existing social glue of Islam. Intellectuals and politicians of this generation
were concerned above all with political independence and the creation and
safeguarding of the modern institutions through which their political and economic
aspirations could be mediated and furthered.80 The political universe, until the end
of the First World War, was relatively narrow and confined to these elites, but the
norms they established, in often antagonistic partnership with the colonial powers,
75 Ibid., p. 29.
76 Hisham Sharabi, Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875–1914 (Baltimore and
London: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 11.
77 See Nikki Keddie, Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, 1796–1925 (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda
Publishers, 1999).
78 Gabriel Baer, A History of Land Ownership in Modern Egypt, 1800–1950 (London: Oxford
University Press, 1962), pp. 60–3.
79 Ervand Abrahamian, ‘The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran’, International Journal of
Middle East Studies, 10:3 (1979), pp. 381–414.
80 See Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid-Marsot, Egypt’s Liberal Experiment, 1922–1936 (Berkeley and London:
University of California Press, 1977), p. 39; Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939,
pp. 139–40; Ervand Abrahamian, ‘The Causes of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran’.
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remained as the Ottoman Empire was carved up into Mandates, Egypt became
a subservient constitutional monarchy and Iran fell under the authoritarian
modernising regime of Reza Shah.
Nationalism as an integrative process
As the political sphere deepened further in the interwar period to include a larger
generation of new middle classes that would come to advocate diﬀerent political
and ideological strategies, the vertical exchange of ideas continued as a two-way
process. The notion that ideologies have not remained static over time, or among
social groups, is not alien to scholars of Middle Eastern politics and International
Relations. As Raymond Hinnebusch, engaging with Barnett’s dichotomy, has
stressed:
This contest between Arabism and sovereignty was not exclusively played out at the
inter-state level and a state’s adoption of Pan-Arabism (or not) was in good part a result of
internal power struggles. The most successful political movements inside the Arab states in
the 1950s mobilised their constituents under the banner of Arabism: radical versions of
Arabism were normally the ideological weapon of rising social forces with an interest in
change, specifically the new middle class challenging the oligarchy in the 1950s.81
Eric Davis, more broadly, has argued with respect to Islamic revivalism that
ideological trends are intimately linked to social change and should not be viewed
‘isomorphically’, or detached from their immediate contexts.82 But such recognition
has not been integrated into the dialogues model even though there is no evidence
that identity ever ceased to be socially contingent. The ideology-utopia dialectic, in
other words, did not end in the 1950s.
From the 1930s nationalism came to reflect the aspirations of this new
generation of middle classes in Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, often termed the
eﬀendiyya.83Although it is from within this group that the more ‘radical’ variant of
Arabism arose – as Hinnebusch and others have noted – what is not always
emphasised is the extent to which middle class intellectuals also embraced statism
– ideas were moving both up and down the generational and social ladder. The
political climate in the Middle East was not one of peasant revolution, and the
‘mass’ movements of the time – the Muslim Brotherhood, Ba’th, socialists,
communists – were largely, though not exclusively, vehicles for the urban middle
classes. They were indeed revolutionary, but tended more toward the French rather
than Chinese model. To be sure, they resented the established elite’s monopolisa-
tion of political authority, positions and social prestige. But they identified to a
large extent with the interests of those elites in maintaining a minimum level of
stability and continuity, as while they:
81 Hinnebusch, International Politics of the Middle East, p. 65. For a similar perspective see also
Valbjø‘Arab Nationalism(s) in Transformation: From Arab Interstate Societies to an Arab-Islamic
World Society’.
82 ‘The Concept of Revival and the Study of Islam and Politics’, in B. F. Stowasser (ed.), The Islamic
Impulse (London: Croom Helm in association with Center for Contemporary Arab Studies,
Georgetown University, 1987).
83 See Michael Eppel, ‘Note about the Term Eﬀendiyya in the History of the Middle East’,
International Journal of Middle East Studies, 41 (2009), p. 536.
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. . . had no objective interest in the survival of this oppressive, obstructed transitional
system, . . . they did have a stake in the growth of a national capitalism. An extension of
capitalism would enable the intellectuals of this class to achieve a higher social level; and
expanding capitalism would need middle-level cadres and intellectual and cultural
spokesmen.84
The excluded and ambitious formed a rising counter-elite whose intellectuals,
‘subject to the ideological and political pull both of the classes above and below
them’,85 were the architects and theoreticians of nationalist revolutions following
the Second World War. They shared rural connections, and often conservative
religious backgrounds, that certainly informed their worldviews and political
strategies. In the case of Iraq, for example:
[N]ationalism did not displace the old loyalties. Although it grew at their expense, it existed
side by side with them, corroding them, yes, but at the same time absorbing some of their
psychological elements and expressing itself within the emotional and conceptual patterns
of the Islamic religion.86
They combined these sensitivities with statism, meaning that following indepen-
dence each of these orientations was sustained by regimes and among the middle
classes, where the revolutionary movements and parties maintained, to varying
degrees, their followings. The variable relationship between these middle class
movements, on the one hand, and the state, on the other, is one that must be taken
into account when scrutinising the role of ideas.
Students of nationalism in general have long recognised these dynamics. Tom
Nairn, for example, has termed nationalism the ‘modern Janus’ to refer to
the fact that social movements striving to achieve progressive modern goals –
industrialisation, prosperity, independence, democracy – look inwards and back-
wards to draw on indigenous cultural resources and memories and mobilise mass
support. Nationalist movements do not simply invent or ‘imagine’ national
communities as the initial slate is never blank: ‘all that there was [for nationalists]
was the people and peculiarities of the region: its inherited ethnos, speech, folklore,
skin colour, and so on’.87 These resources are used to craft ideologies that blend
the universal with the particular. The most successful such movement in Egypt was
the Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood, but here and elsewhere other movements
tried in diﬀerent ways to harness local resources for national ends: the ‘domesti-
cation’ of Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian and Palestinian communist movements should be
seen as processes in which localised versions of Marxist ideas came to inform the
‘norms of Arabism’ described by Barnett.88
Engaging with modernity meant accepting the sovereign nation-state as the
supreme object of political identification, but disguising or ‘universalising’ that
84 Mahmoud Hussein, Class Conflict in Egypt, 1945–1970 (New York and London: Monthly Review
Press, 1973), p. 32. See also Laroui, The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or
Historicism?, pp. 159–66.
85 Mahmoud Hussein, Class Conflict in Egypt, p. 29.
86 Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq, p. 22.
87 Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: NLB, 1977), p. 340.
88 See, for example, Joel Beinin Was the Red Flag Flying There?: Marxist Politics and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict in Egypt and Israel 1948–1965, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), p. 57; Selma
Botman The Rise of Egyptian Communism, 1939–1970 (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press,
1988), p. 49. Batatu’s tome on Iraq, cited above, amply documents the Iraqi communist party’s
leadership of the national movement there in the 1940s and 1950s. See also, the extended review of
same by Peter Sluglett, Democratiya, 4 (2006).
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allegiance in order to resonate with broad-based political programmes. Social
movements, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Ba’th and communist parties, did
not eschew statism, or the acceptance that diplomacy, sovereignty and compromise
may be part of international politics. But they significantly augmented acceptance
of the sanctity of the nation-state with supra- and sub-state loyalties. For the
intellectuals of the Muslim Brotherhood, this meant elaborating a theory of Arab
solidarity that was integral to their vision of Islam, solidarity with Palestinians as
Muslims, a concept of umma as the aspirational focus of loyalty and the ultimate
desire to restore the Caliphate.89 For communists, on the other hand, the focus was
on the class struggle internally, which, with some success, they connected to the
external struggle against imperialism and Zionism.90
The emergence of competing national identities – in a process the reverse of
that described by Mannheim in Europe – involved the ideological welding together
of the ‘modern’ ideas that had undergirded the transition to ‘enlightened
absolutism’ in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire since the early nineteenth century,
with new ones derived by the counter-elite from the pre-existing traditions of
society. Normative change reflected not only local reactions to European
imperialism – the mechanism by which statism and the norms of sovereignty were
spread around the globe – but also revolutionary change within the social
formations being drawn into the international system.91
Reintegrating the Second Image
The interstate, or third image, perspective results in a distorted picture of the role
of ideas. We must incorporate the domestic level. It is instructive, in suggesting
how this might be achieved, to return to the politics of the United Arab Republic
in the late 1950s and early 1960s – considered to be pivotal in the transformation
of Arabist norms and emblematic of their power in driving regional politics. A
closer look at the events of this period illustrates the pitfalls of the dialogues model
and the advantages of the more sociological approach suggested here. Far from
being a ‘game’ carried out by Arab state players, regional politics had deep
reverberations in Arab societies. Nasser’s ‘turn to the right’ following the rise of
Qasim in Iraq expressed the regime’s real nervousness about the left as a domestic
opposition in Egypt and Syria. It is not irrelevant to note that from 1958
thousands of communists were arrested in Egypt, leftist newspaper editors were
sacked, and select members of the banned Muslim Brotherhood were brought into
government.92 In the Iraqi case, the domestic stakes were perhaps even higher. As
Peter Sluglett has observed:
89 See Richard P. Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim Brothers (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), p. 264.
90 El-Sa’id, Rifa’at, and Y. Ismael Tareq, The Communist Movement in Egypt: 1920–1988, Contempo-
rary Issues in the Middle East (Syracuse; London: Syracuse University Press, 1990), p. 43.
91 For analysis supporting this interpretation see Nahas, ‘State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge:
Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East’.
92 Anouar Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military Society: The Army Regime, the Left, and Social Change Under
Nasser, 1st ed. (New York: Random House, 1968); el Kosheri Mahfouz, Socialisme et pouvoir en
Égypte (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1972).
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The battle between the Communist and anti-Communist forces in Iraq from 1958 to 1963
has been reduced by other commentators . . . to the question of whether Iraq would or
would not join the United Arab Republic. The more fundamental issue, which sometimes
gets lost in the narrative, was how much of a genuine socialist transformation Iraq should
be permitted to undergo. If Iraq joined the UAR, political parties would be abolished, and
all chance of carrying out thorough-going social and economic reforms would be lost.93
The apparent rise of ‘statism’ and the practices associated with the norms of
sovereignty arguably owed more to the insecurities of the Arab regimes, nervous
about the deepening of revolutions in individual states, than to the increased
legitimacy of either the states system or state leaderships. Communists in Iraq and
Egypt were against Arab unity as it would provide a cover for the expansion of
Nasserist absolutism and a brake on the deepening of revolution.94 In this case
it was a nominally universalist societal movement representing the interests of a
politically frustrated section of the middle class (and in the Iraqi case majority
sect) that was working toward the entrenchment of state sovereignty, while
regimes trumpeted Arabism. The phase of Arab summitry from 1963, during
which, as Barnett notes, the Arab states apparently reinforced and elevated the
norms of sovereignty; those same states became their most bellicose toward Israel,
vowing for the first time to ‘liquidate’ it.95 But this was arguably not as much
about pandering to society as it was providing an excuse for ‘radical’ and
‘conservative’ Arab states to unite against the revolutionary tendencies in their
societies. The order of causation in the following observation may, in other words,
be reversed:
Arab-Israeli confrontations often had an ameliorating eﬀect on inter-Arab conflicts. So
periods of heightened tension between Israel and her neighbours were frequently
characterized by temporary truces in the radical-conservative feud as was the case during
the crisis over the diversion of the waters of the River Jordan in 1964.96
It may have been the ‘temporary truces’, entered into for domestic reasons, which
led to the displays of bellicosity toward Israel.
Norms related to the threat of war (anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism) have
continued to reinforce, not contradict, statism by providing a socially intelligible
justification for state military and coercive apparatuses. The threat of interstate
war, even if premised on ‘Arabist’ norms, encourages the integration of the Arab
state into a global normative system, since
Preparation for war is funded by foreign military assistance or rents of one form or
another, war making is undertaken with imported weapons, global strategic networks and
global norms of sovereignty and nonintervention are mobilized to secure local military
advantage, and peace settlements are negotiated and guaranteed by external powers.97
93 Peter Sluglett, review of Hana Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of
Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of its Communists, Ba’thists and Free
Oﬃcers, in Democratiya, 4 (2006).
94 For details of the agreement between Egyptian and Iraqi communists on this issue see Mahmud
Amin al-Alim, Confessions of the Sheikh of the Arab Communists: Mahmoud Amin Al-Alim [In
Arabic] (Cairo: Maktabat Madbuli, 2006), p. 43.
95 Avi Shlaim The Iron Wall : Israel and the Arab World (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), p. 230.
96 Nahas, ‘State-Systems and Revolutionary Challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East’,
p. 517.
97 Steven Heydemann, ‘War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East’, in Steven
Heydemann (ed.), War, Institutions, and Social Change in the Middle East (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2000), section 1. Available at: {http://ark.edlib.org/ark:/13030/ft6c6006X6/}.
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But this (realist) proposition that the nature of the international system constrains,
obliges or encourages statism must be balanced against the observation that
societal actors also manipulate anti-Zionist and anti-imperialist sentiments with
ultimately statist eﬀects. Governments do not have a monopoly on the ‘instru-
mentalisation’ of foreign policy.98 It has been recently argued that Arabism, while
it has declined at the state level, has remained of high salience in society and
amongst opposition movements. This is in reference to the role of groups like
Hizbullah and the Muslim Brotherhood that keep alive anti-Zionist and anti-
imperialist causes as well as the role of new media in the crystallisation of the Arab
‘public sphere’.99 But the ongoing interests of states in sustaining Arabism, and
societal movements in encouraging statism, need to be acknowledged and further
explored.
Some recent examples may serve to illustrate this point. Across the region,
demonstrations against the 2003 invasion of Iraq expressed not just anger directed
against imperialists, but also middle class frustration at the blocked, stagnant or
corrupt political systems in the states that had failed to prevent it. In Egypt, for
example, the years following the 2000 al-Aqsa intifada and the Iraq invasion of
2003 witnessed the formation of the kefaya movement, which linked Muslim
Brothers, Nasserists, and others in a movement for democracy.100 This impulse was
echoed by intellectuals across the region, many of whom contended that, among
other things, ‘Arab countries need to embark on democratic reform because
authoritarian regimes cannot form a bond with their population and thus are easily
defeated militarily’.101 The so-called Ceder Revolution or ‘Independence Intifada’
in 2005, which aimed at ejecting Syria from the Lebanon, represents a further
example of Arabist norms (the word intifada invoking the Palestinian uprising)
driving a move toward greater respect for sovereignty and statism. Perhaps most
indicative of the mingling, and mutual reinforcement, of norms of Arabism and
sovereignty between state and society is the 2005 decision by Hizbullah to enter the
Lebanese government, in part as a way of retaining its military apparatus and
ensuring the legality of its armed resistance against Israel. As Lara Deeb notes,
Hizballah does not regard its participation in government as contradicting its maintenance
of a non-state militia. In fact, the first item on Hizballah’s 2005 electoral platform pledged
to ‘safeguard Lebanon’s independence and protect it from the Israeli menace by
safeguarding the Resistance, Hizballah’s military wing and its weapons, in order to achieve
total liberation of Lebanese occupied land’.102
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Conclusion
It has not been the purpose of this article to argue that distinguishing between
universal (or Western) norms and those particular to the Middle East is impossible
or meaningless. Timothy Mitchell is correct to argue that distinctive ‘provincial’
cultural or institutional forms should be recognised as such.103 But distinctiveness
or particularity does not adhere – as IR constructivists suggest – to abstractions
like ‘society’, nationhood or ‘national culture’, much less to even more dubious
transnational categories like ‘Islam’ or ‘the Arabs’. Nor does modernity – statism
and the norm of sovereignty – adhere only to the state. Elements of the universal
and the provincial must rather be sought out, identified and theorised within and
throughout state and society. The norm of sovereignty – and the idea that the
nation-state constituted the ultimate and unassailable expression of political
identity – was written into the fabric of Arab states from the beginning. It should
not be juxtaposed with Arabism. To do so is to fall into the trap of confusing
ethnic traits (linguistic, religious, etc.) that remain only relatively constant across
state borders, with the politicisation of local culture by middle class national
revolutionary movements.
Attempts like those of Paul Aarts to understand the political and economic
disunity, and the prospects for greater integration, in the Middle East in terms of
social class – particularly the roles of middle classes – have been suggestive.104 So
too has been that of Keith Krause to elucidate Middle Eastern regional security
with reference to the fact that ‘domestic political configurations matter for regional
security-building’ and that ‘domestic and regional politics are inseparable in any
discussion of region-building’.105 The black box of the state should also be opened
to elucidate the role of ideas in regional politics.
It remains to briefly indicate some of the ways in which the findings of this article
can advance the discipline of IR. The first would be to point out that there are
multiple traditions in Middle East Studies that deal with the role of ideas, culture and
identity, and those based on Orientalist or modernisation theory premises are perhaps
the weakest. IR theorists should treat evidence from the Middle East with the caution
and scepticism it deserves and not assume that accounts of identity debates, promi-
nent or otherwise, represent the whole – or even correct – picture. Although perhaps
harder to conduct research into the dynamics of political decision-making in this
region than in some others, there are nevertheless important precendents from an
historical sociology and political economy tradition that provide richer alternatives to
the realist or modernisation theory approaches to Middle Eastern politics as well as
models for future empirical study. More broadly, this article challenges moderate
constructivism in general. It has suggested that the interstate dialogues model
sacrifices considerable nuance in its attempt to ‘reconceptualise the history of
inter-Arab politics’ and, in pursuit of parsimony, glosses over or distorts the social
and political dynamics that more accurately illustrate the role of ideas in the Middle
East as, undoubtedly, elsewhere. The second image, in short, cannot be discarded.
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